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TOR:201538Z MAY 74

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2849

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO RUFHNA/USMISSION NATO PRIORITY 1648

RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 3618

RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3086

RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR PRIORITY

RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

BT

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 4499

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: NEXT STEPS IN VERIFICATION

REF: A, STATE 101849; B, UNSATO 2440; C, BONN 07849

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: WITH REGARD TO SPC DISCUSSION OF VERIFICATION SCHEDULED FOR MAY 21 AND MAY 24, THE DELEGATION WOULD PREFER TO SEE ANY MBFR REDUCTION SUPPORTED BY AS COMPREHENSIVE A VERIFICATION SYSTEM AS POSSIBLE, THUS PROVIDING HIGHEST LEVELS OF CONFIDENCE TO POLITICAL LEADERSHIP THAT TERMS OF AGREEMENT ARE BEING OBSERVED. DELEGATION REALIZES, HOWEVER, THAT FRG OPPOSITION TO MOBILE TEAMS AS REPORTED IN REFS (B) AND (C) IS INTENSE AND CONCURS IN THE VIEW THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO CONSIDER MODIFYING US POSITION ON USE OF MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS AS THEY CONCERN VERIFICATION IN PHASE I. WE SHOULD RESERVE OUR POSITION COMPLETELY AS REGARDS VERIFICATION IN PHASE II. SUBJECT TO THE RESULTS OF THE ON-GOING VERIFICATION ASSESSMENT IN WASHINGTON, WE WOULD SUGGEST SEEKING SUPPORT OF THE FRG FOR A NAC DECISION ON AN ALLIED VERIFICATION PROGRAM PROVIDING FOR: (A) AIR INSPECTION ON NGA TO BE CARRIED OUT BY EASTERN TEAMS AND EQUIPMENT STATIONED IN THE EASTERN PORTION OF REDUCTION AREA AND WESTERN TEAMS AND EQUIPMENT STATIONED IN NATO PART OF REDUCTION AREA; (B) USE OF OBSERVERS AT A NUMBER OF SPECIFIED ENTRY-EXIT POINTS, TOGETHER WITH REQUIREMENT THAT ALL US AND SOVIET EXISTS AND RE-ENTRIES BE MADE THROUGH

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THESE POINTS; AND (C) A SPECIFIED NUMBER OF CHALLENGE OBSERVATIONS BY GROUND OBSERVERS TO CHECK INFORMATION INDICATING POSSIBLE BREACH OF THE AGREEMENT.
END SUMMARY.

2. WHILE WE WOULD MUCH PREFER MANNED OBSERVATION WITH FREE ACCESS TO MAXIMUM AREA ON BOTH SIDES OF DIVIDING LINE IN REDUCTION AREA, WE MUST KEEP IN MIND BOTH THE PROBLEM OF OBTAINING ALLIED AGREEMENT TO OUR PROPOSAL AND ITS NEGOTIATIBILITY WITH THE EAST. AS WE SEE THE FEDERAL GERMAN POSITION, THE PRINCIPAL GERMAN OBJECTION IS TO THE CONCEPT OF EXTRA-TERRITORIAL SOVIET INSPECTION TEAMS WITH FREEDOM TO ROAM FRG TERRITORY AT WILL. WE DO NOT SEE PROSPECT THAT FRG WILL DROP THIS OPPOSITION AND WOULD CONSIDER IT COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO SEEK TO PUSH IT THROUGH NATO AGAINST FRG OPPOSITION ONLY TO FIND, AS APPEARS LIKELY, THAT THE PROPOSAL IS UNACCEPTABLE TO EAST.

3. WE BELIEVE FRG OBJECTIONS TO INTRUSIVE OBSERVATION BY SOVIETS MIGHT BE DIMINISHED THROUGH CONCEPT OF AERIAL OBSERVATION BY LIGHT FIXED WING AIRCRAFT OR HELICOPTER, WITH THE EASTERN PERSONNEL CARRYING OUR THIS VERIFICATION TO BE STATIONED ON WARSAW PACT SIDE OF DIVIDING LINE AND WESTERN PERSONNEL ON THE WESTERN SIDE. AS REGARDS SOVIET ATTITUDE, ANY FORM OF FREE WESTERN OBSERVATION OF WARSAW PACT AREA IS LIKELY TO ENCOUNTER STIFF RESISTANCE, AND THERE IS ONLY REMOTE CHANCE OF ITS ACCEPTANCE. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE SLIGHTLY MORE INCLINED TO ACCEPT AERIAL OBSERVATION THAN INTRUSIVE GROUND OBSERVATION ENTAILING UNDESIRABLE POSSIBILITY OF PERSON-TO-PERSON CONTACTS.

4. DELEGATION IS NOT IN A POSITION TO MAKE A TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE VALUE OF NTM SUPPLEMENTED BY A SYSTEM OF OBSERVERS STATIONED AT A FIXED NUMBER OF POINTS OF ENTRY WITH US AND SOVIET EXIT AND ENTRY TO THE REDUCTION AREA RESTRICTED TO THESE OBSERVED POINTS, HOWEVER, IT IS CLEAR THAT SUCH A SYSTEM COULD SUPPLY THE WEST WITH INFORMATION IT DOES NOT NOW HAVE AND APPLY RESTRICTIONS TO THE SOVIETS WHICH WOULD INCREASE WESTERN CONFIDENCE IN A PHSE I MBFR

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AGREEMENT, BY MAKING SURPRISE ATTACK MORE DIFFICULT, THIS CONCEPT WOULD PARTIALLY MEET OUR OBJECTIVE OF USING THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS TO DEVISE MEANS OF BETTER INSULATING WESTERN EUROPEAN POLITICAL DECISION MAKERS AGAINST SOVIET EFFORTS TO USE LOCAL PREPONDERANCE OF FORCES AS SOURCE OF POLITICAL PRESSURE ON WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS, WE THEREFORE CONSIDER ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS OBJECTIVE HIGHLY DESIRABLE FROM WESTERN INTERESTS.

5. AT THE SAME TIME, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD PROVE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE EASTERN AGREEMENT TO SUCH A PROPOSAL, FOR THAT REASON, WE THINK IT WOULD BE TACTICALLY INADVISABLE TO ADVANCE IT ON ITS OWN, UNACCOMPANIED BY OTHER VERIFICATION MEASURES. CHANCES OF OBTAINING EASTERN AGREEMENT TO A SYSTEM OF AGREED OBSERVERS AT EXIT-ENTRY POINTS WOULD BE ENHANCED IF THE WEST LAYS DOWN A MORE COMPREHENSIVE VERIFICATION PROGRAM INCLUDING FREE UNRESTRICTED AIR OBSERVATION AND INSPECTION BY CHALLENGE AS WELL AS THE CONCEPT OF FIXED ENTRY-EXIT POINTS. IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATION WITH THE EAST, WE MIGHT BE OBLIGED TO DROP THE CONCEPT OF AIR OBSERVATION, AND WE SHOULD TELL THE GERMANS THAT WE WOULD NOT MAKE EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THIS AIR VERIFICATION CONCEPT A PRE-CONDITION FOR A PHASE I AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, AT THE LEAST, IT COULD BE BUILT INTO A USEFUL BARGAINING POSITION. SIMILARLY, A FIXED NUMBER OF CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS ON THE GROUND BY OBSERVER TEAMS, WHICH MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO FRG, PARTICULARLY AS TEAMS COULD BE COMPOSED OF ALREADY ASSIGNED ATTACHES OR OF PERSONNEL NORMALLY STATIONED OUTSIDE THE AREA, WOULD BE A USEFUL SUPPLEMENT TO NTM. IT MAY BE POSSIBLE IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATION TO OBTAIN EASTERN AGREEMENT TO BOTH FIXED ENTRY POINTS OR CHALLENGE INSPECTION OR AT LEAST TO ONE OF THEM, DEPENDING ON NEGOTIATING CIRCUMSTANCES. IT SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT THE GERMANS WOULD AGREE TO THIS PROGRAM IF THESE CONSIDERATIONS WERE EXPLAINED TO THEM BILATERALLY.

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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUFHNA/USMISSION NATO PRIORITY 1649
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 3619
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3087
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR PRIORITY
RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
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SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 VIENNA 4499
FROM US REP MBFR

6. FURTHER POINTS IN SUPPORT OF OUR RECOMMENDATION
ARE THE FACT THAT THE NOVEMBER 22, 1973 PRESENTATION OF THE
ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL INCLUDED THE CONCEPT OF
"INSPECTION BY OBSERVERS." WE CONSIDER IT DESIRABLE
TO MAINTAIN ALLIANCE CREDIBILITY BY COMING
FORWARD WITH A PROPOSAL THAT INCLUDES THIS CONCEPT.
MOREOVER, PREVIOUS DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE IN THE
AHG HAS INDICATED THAT MANY ALLIES WOULD FAVOR
OBSERVERS OF SOME SORT TO SATISFY THEIR OWN PUBLIC
OPINION. BOTH POINTS (A) AND (C) OF OUR PROPOSED
VERIFICATION PROGRAM WOULD ENTAIL THIS POSSIBILITY.
7. WE ASSUME IN THIS CONNECTION THAT THE U.S. WOULD
WISH TO PRESERVE THE RIGHT TO USE ENTRY POINTS IN
THE NETHERLANDS AND BELGIUM EVEN IF SUCH USE WERE
NORMALLY NOT THE MOST EFFICIENT FROM AN ECONOMIC
OR MILITARY VIEWPOINT. PRESERVING THESE RIGHTS WOULD
ENTAIL THE STATIONING OF EASTERN OBSERVERS AT SUCH
POINTS. THIS BROADER PATTERN OF STATIONING WOULD
MEET THE FRG CONCERNS ABOUT THE BECOMING A SPECIAL
ZONE.

8. WE ARE SOMEWHAT CONCERNED ABOUT THE SUGGESTION
IN PARA 9 OF REF (B) THAT, EVEN IF COMPROMISE WERE
REACHED ON EXIT-ENTRY OBSERVERS, THE GERMANS WOULD WISH
TO PHASE OUT ALL OVERT SYSTEMS ONCE WITHDRAWALS ARE
COMPLETED AND RELY SOLELY ON NTM FOR VERIFICATION
OF CONTINUING FORCE LEVELS. WE CONSIDER VERIFICATION OF COM-
PLIANCE WITH FORCE LEVELS AFTER REDUCTIONS ARE
COMPLETED PROBABLY MORE IMPORTANT THAN VERIFICATION

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OF THE WITHDRAWALS THEMSELVES. CONSEQUENTLY, WHATEVER ALLIED PROPOSAL IS MADE FOR OVERT INSPECTION SHOULD APPLY FOR THE LIFE OF THE MBFR PHASE I AGREEMENT.

9. WE RECOMMEND THAT, FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF NECESSARY TECHNICAL STUDIES, BUT AS SOON AS PRACTICAL, THE US SHOULD RAISE WITH THE FRG A VERIFICATION PROGRAM ON LINES DESCRIBED ABOVE. HUMBES

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